Abstract: People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras and Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behavior and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from four studies that folk psychology unambiguously views monothematic delusions as clear cases of belief. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief's stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients
as holding contradictory beliefs. And we also show that frequent assertion is an extraordinarily powerful cue to belief-ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behavior.
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A Question of Attitude: Are Delusions Beliefs?
In their work on clinical subjects, Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) present the case of a patient named DS. DS was a middleaged man who suffered a traumatic brain injury in a gruesome traffic accident. In the year following his injury he began what appeared to be a remarkable and speedy recovery. DS regained his powers of speech, intelligence, as well as nearly all his cognitive and social skills. However there was something very strange about DS after his accident. He would regularly tell his doctors, family, and friends that his parents had been replaced by imposters! DS was later diagnosed with a condition called Capgras Syndrome, a rare neurological disorder where patients suffer the delusion that someone close to them -such as a loved one, family member, or friend -has been replaced by a duplicate or imposter. Typical of Capgras patients, when others confront DS with putative evidence that his parents are not actually imposters, his assertions to the contrary persist. In the words of DS when interviewed by Hirstein and Ramachandran, "He looks exactly like my father but he really isn't. He's a nice guy, but he isn't my father, Doctor" (p.
438).
As is also typical of patients with Capgras Syndrome, despite DS's assertions, he doesn't exhibit the stereotypical non-verbal behaviors we would normally expect if he believed that these people are impostors. Capgras patients typically continue to share their lives with the purported imposters. The presence of these "intruders" is not typically reported to the police. Nor does the syndrome typically lead to flight or violent outbursts of behaviour. which doesn't cohere with what he says about his parents being replaced. He does not run away from these imposters; he does not call the police; he doesn't seek out lost loved ones. On the basis of these non-verbal behaviors, you might naturally conclude that DS believes his parents are really who they say they are. 1 However the syndrome can lead to such behaviours. Studies suggest that upwards of 18% of people with Capgras delusion act on the basis of their delusion, committing acts of violence (Forstl, et al., 1999) .
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists have resisted ascribing to DS the belief that his parents are impostors. These theorists assume that belief has essential properties which DS's delusional attitude lacks. First, beliefs are responsive to evidence, but DS's delusional attitudes aren't. More strongly, some argue that beliefs must be based on evidence (Price, 1967) , but DS's delusional attitudes typically are not. Second, beliefs lead predictably to further beliefs and to behavior that make sense in light of them, whereas DS's overall behavior doesn't seem to make sense in light of the delusional attitudes and his desires. One assumes, for example, that DS doesn't want to live with impostors and wants to reconnect with the purportedly missing loved ones. Third, beliefs lead predictably to affective responses that make sense in light of them, whereas DS doesn't exhibit such responses. He is neither shocked, horrified, nor deeply saddened at the purported fact that impostors have replaced his loved ones. Yet these are feelings that we would naturally expect if the delusional attitudes were genuine beliefs. In sum, delusional attitudes like DS's "fail to play the functional role that is essential to a state's being a belief" (Bayne 2010: 330) . They are far too inferentially, behaviorally, and affectively circumscribed to be beliefs.
Of course this raises an obvious question: what are these attitudes, then? Some say they belong to some other familiar folk-psychological categories, such as imagination (Currie 2000; Currie et al. 2001 Currie et al. , 2002 , pretense (Gendler 2007) , or illusion (Hohwy & Ra-jan 2011) . Others argue that no familiar folk-psychological category fits the bill, which motivates them to invent new categories such as "bimagination" (Egan 2008 ), a hybrid of belief and imagination that incorporates stereotypical elements of both. And even those who defend the "doxasticist" view that delusional attitudes are beliefs say that delusions are "anomalous" or "irrational" beliefs (Bortolotti, 2012; Bortolotti and Mameli, 2012) , or that they are beliefs in some contexts but not others (Reimer 2010) . Still others hold that they aren't "fully" beliefs because they don't "fully meet any relevant folk-psychological stereotype" for belief (Tumulty 2011: 30, n. 2; see also Schwitzgebel 2011 , Schwitzgebel 2001 .
Note well that even those who defend the view that delusions are (at least partly) beliefs agree that these attitudes "deviate" from "the causal-functional patterns in behavior and cognition characteristic of belief," in which case "the assumptions inherent in the practice of belief ascription start to break down." We're then left with a choice: "either abandon belief talk or allow for some indeterminacy in it" (Schwitzgebel 2011: 16 ).
We question the widespread assumption that delusional attitudes, such as DS's, are not viewed as stereotypical beliefs (see, e.g., Bortolotti, 2012; Bortolotti and Mameli, 2012; Frankish, 2011; Murphy, 2011; Egan, 2009; Schwitzgebel, 2001 Schwitzgebel, , 2011 Tumulty, 2011 This paper presents experimental evidence supporting our thesis and its corollary. More specifically, we accomplish three main things. First, using different measures, we show that the folk readily classify Capgras delusions as beliefs. Second, we show that people view these delusions as beliefs because frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief ascription. In folk psychology, frequent assertion just is a behavioral pattern stereotypical of belief. In other words, viewed in the ordinary way, there are situations in which frequently asserting Q is true suffices for believing Q. Third, delusional patients are readily viewed as holding contradictory beliefs, which can explain the ambivalence we feel when considering such cases.
Before presenting our studies, we want to dispel any appearance that our thesis is somehow radical or revisionary and, thus, that we bear an especially demanding burden of proof. We think that belief is the natural first candidate for categorizing delusions. There is much to criticize in this definition. First, it can't be definitive of delusions that they are false. As the saying goes, "Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you." Similarly, just because you're deluded doesn't mean that your family hasn't been replaced. Certainly it's possible for a Capgras patient's family to have been replaced, and thus for the delusion to be true.
The delusion doesn't stop being one at the time of replacement.
Second, it can't be definitive of delusions that they are inferential. If our best neuroscience indicated that DS performs no inference when arriving at the belief that his family has been replaced, it would not follow that he wasn't delusional. Third, it can't be definitive of delusion that it be subject to incontrovertible counterevidence. DS's birth record might have been irretrievably lost, DNA tests are not infallible, memory is not infallible, and superficial "family resemblances" are at best an imperfect guide to judging blood relations. The evidence against DS's delusion is controvertible, but it doesn't follow that DS isn't delusional.
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Although we're aware of this definition's serious deficiencies, we don't think its basic motivation is deficient. Instead, we think it's on the right track. We doubt it's an accident that professionals who 2 For extended criticism of the DSM-IV definition of delusions see Coltheart, 2007. deal most closely with delusional patients choose to define delusion as belief. As we will now proceed to argue, philosophers and cognitive scientists tempted to characterize delusional attitudes as beliefs have been right from the start.
Although we present evidence that folk psychology readily characterizes delusional attitudes as stereotypical belief, things could have turned out otherwise. It could have turned out that the folk readily deny or are ambivalent about ascribing beliefs to delusional subjects. Had it turned out that way, it would have provided strong evidence that philosophers and cognitive scientists were right to deny that delusional attitudes are viewed as stereotypical beliefs.
Experiment 1: Robust belief-ascription to Capgras patients
This first experiment provides evidence that people view Capgras delusions as beliefs. It also provides evidence that significant behavioral circumscription is consistent with the profile of stereotypical belief.
Methods
Participants (N = 121) tions in a 2 (Action Profile: Typical, Atypical) × 2 (Probe: Thinks, Believes) between-subjects design.
All participants read a basic story describing a typical case of his partner as he did before his accident and as partners typically treat one another:
Typical. Katherine was very surprised and saddened by the things Don would say. At the same time, Don continued to always eat meals with her, go to the movies with her, live in the same house as her, and sleep in the same bed as her.
Participants in Atypical conditions read a conclusion to the story in which the protagonist treats his partner as we might expect him to treat an impostor and intruder:
Atypical. Katherine was very surprised and saddened by the things Don would say. At the same time, Don now always refused to eat meals with her, go to the movies with her, live in the same house as her, and sleep in the same bed as her.
We included the Typical/Atypical manipulation in order to determine whether the delusion's behavioral circumscription affects rates of belief ascription. That is, we wanted to know whether people's view of the case changes when the protagonist goes from not acting in a way that coheres with the delusion's content, to acting in a way that coheres with it. The typical Capgras patient does not act consistently with the delusion's content, but unless we manipulate this factor, we can't be confident how behavioral circumscription affects the way people view the case. It is almost universally assumed in the literature that behavioral circumscription counts against classifying delusion as a belief. Will this assumption withstand empirical scrutiny?
After reading the story, all participants were asked a comprehension question to make sure they understood the protagonist's behavioral profile: 
Results
We're interested in two questions. havioral circumscription had no effect on whether the folk viewed the Capgras patient as having the belief that his wife is an imposter. Belief was nearly unanimously ascribed despite significant behavioral circumscription in Capgras cases. Had participants failed to unanimously ascribe belief, or had significant behavioral circumscription impacted ordinary judgments, this would have supported the claim that delusional attitude is not best characterized in terms of stereotypical belief. However, our results suggest that folk psychology recognizes cases of monothematic delusion as stereotypical instances of belief. The question we are now faced with is why folk psychology recognizes cases of monothematic delusions as instances of stereotypical belief. We take this up in the experiments that follow.
Experiment 2: Assertion and Contradiction
Some writers have speculated that a Capgras patient's willingness to assert the delusional content is "prima facie evidence for supposing that" they believe the delusional content (Reimer 2010: 325-6 ).
Moreover, it has recently been shown experimentally that, on some ways of measuring belief-ascription, belief-ascription rises dramatically when the protagonist verbally endorses the proposition (Buckwalter, Rose and Turri 2013) . Indeed, this work has suggested that assertion can make the difference between attributing and denying belief.
Some writers have also speculated that there might be significant continuity between cases of self-deception and delusions (e.g., Bortolotti and Mameli, 2012) , while others have denied that there is any significant continuity (e.g., Murphy, 2011) . On a standard view of self-deception (e.g., Davidson, 1982 Davidson, , 1986 
Methods
Participants ( The Probe manipulation is similar to the one in Experiment 1.
Participants in Believes conditions were asked to rate their agreement with the statement that Don "believes" a certain proposition is true. Participants in Thinks conditions were asked to rate their agreement with the statement that Don "thinks" a certain proposition is true. The motivation for this manipulation is two-fold. First, as already mentioned, prior results showed that when a protagonist verbally endorses a proposition, the effect on belief-ascription can depend on how one probes for belief-ascription. Second, and relatedly, we again wanted to ensure that our results were not due to peculiarities associated with any one way of probing for belief-ascription.
Responses were collected on a standard 7-point Likert scale, anchored with "Strongly Disagree," "Disagree," "Somewhat Disagree," "Neutral," "Somewhat Agree," "Agree," and "Strongly
Agree," left-to-right on the participant's screen, and coded "-3" 
Results
An analysis of variance revealed an overall effect of condition on be- We call attention to a range of relevant aspects of these results.
First, when Don asserts only once that Katherine is an impostor, neither way of probing do participants ascribe to him the belief that
Katherine is an impostor. One-sample t-tests show that the mean response to the "thinks" probe didn't differ significantly from the Fourth, when Don asserts every day that Katherine is an impostor, the "thinks" and "believes" probes elicit significantly differ-ent responses in Wife conditions. When asked whether they agree that Don thinks that Katherine is his wife, the mean response is significantly above the neutral midpoint, M = 0.68, SD = 1.406, t(24) = 2.418, p = 0.024. By contrast, when asked whether they agree that Don believes that Katherine is his wife, the mean response is below the midpoint, though not significantly so, M = -0.35, t(22) = -0.723,
On the ordinary way of evaluating the case, then, we may conclude the following about Don's case. In light of Don's isolated assertion that Katherine is an impostor:
• it's unclear whether he thinks that she is an impostor;
• he doesn't believe that she is an impostor;
• he definitely thinks that she is his wife; and
• he believes that she is his wife.
By contrast, in light of Don's daily assertions that Katherine is an impostor:
• he definitely thinks that she is an impostor;
• he definitely believes that she is an impostor;
• he thinks that she is his wife; but • it's unclear whether he believes that she is his wife.
Fifth, and most importantly, it follows from what we've already said that people tend to ascribe contradictory attitudes to a prototypical Capgras patient. More specifically, when Don regularly asserts that Katherine is an impostor, people agree both that he thinks that Katherine is an impostor and that he thinks that Katherine is his wife.
Sixth, compounding the fact that people tend to agree that Don thinks contradictory claims are true, they also view Don as "thinking" something is true without also "believing" it. More specifically, they view him as thinking it's true that Katherine is his wife, but they do not view him as believing that she is his wife. In light of this serious, compound tension, it's perfectly understandable that some theorists would consider revising aspects of the ordinary ways of viewing such cases. In particular, it's understandable that they would consider denying that Don thinks that both of these things are true, and then pick one of them to reject. Ironically, however, these theorists end up rejecting that Don thinks Katherine is an impostor, whereas ordinarily people think it's much clearer that Don thinks she is an impostor than that he thinks she's his wife.
Seventh, the results in Frequent conditions demonstrate the surprising power that assertion has in eliciting belief ascription.
Consider all the non-verbal behavior which is well explained by ascribing to Don the belief that Katherine is his wife: he always eats meals with her, goes out with her, lives with her, and sleeps in the same bed as her. When it comes to eliciting belief-ascription, this persistent and robust profile of non-verbal behavior pales in comparison to the power of circumscribed but consistent verbal behavior. All Don has to do is to say daily, "You are an impostor," and people overwhelmingly ascribe to him the relevant belief. Despite the old adage, "Actions speak louder than words," when it comes to belief, it seems that words can sometimes speak far louder than actions. To swap one adage for another, in evaluating what others believe, "the tongue is mightier than the sword."
Finally, the pattern of results suggests that if you "believe" that something is true, then you "think" that it is true. But the converse does not hold: if you "think" that something is true, it's still an open question whether you also "believe" that it is true. This replicates previous findings, in which the "thinks" probe elicited significantly higher rates of ascription than the "believes" probe (Buckwalter, Rose and Turri, 2013; . But whereas previous findings were all obtained using dichotomous agreement measures (yes/no agreement), we now observe the same effect using 7-point scales. The difference between the two probes persists across different measures, adding further support to the claim that the pair tracks an important distinction in the folk psychology of belief.
Experiment 3: Strength from Within
The results from Experiment 2 suggest an explanation for why folk psychology recognizes cases of Capgras delusion as instances of stereotypical belief: frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief ascription. In other words, in folk psychology, a pattern of frequent assertion is stereotypically associated with belief. Experiment 2 also provided initial support for the claim that, on the ordinary way of viewing matters, paradigmatic Capgras patients have contradictory beliefs. Participants tended to view Don as both thinking that Katherine is his wife and thinking that she is an impostor. However, we used a between-subjects design, so no one participant ascribed both of those beliefs to Don. It might be objected that a within-subjects design would produce very different results. Put otherwise, better evidence for a tendency toward contradictory ascription would come from individual participants ascribing both beliefs together, as opposed to different groups of participants ascribing each belief separately. This experiment follows up on this suggestion.
Methods
Participants ( believes/thinks Katherine is an impostor. Otherwise, the procedure was the same as in Experiment 2.
Results
The main question is whether participants would continue to ascribe contradictory beliefs to Don. It turns out that they did. In So, even when using a within-subjects design, we continue to find that participants attribute the belief to Don that his wife is an imposter. And, importantly, we continue to find that people -indeed the same individuals -are willing to ascribe contradictory attitudes to Don, namely, that he both thinks that Katherine is an imposter and thinks that she is his wife.
Experiment 4: A Figment of Imagination?
Experiments 1-3 provided evidence that folk psychology recognizes cases of monothematic delusions as stereotypical beliefs. But at least two objections arise at this point.
The first objection is that at least some participants might be ascribing belief due to pragmatic pressures associated with principles of charity rather than features stereotypically associated with belief. That is, they might answer that Don believes (thinks) that
Katherine is an impostor because they think he should believe this.
For instance, it's a common injunction to "say what you believe and believe what you say." It would strengthen our results if we could rule out such over-ascription due to charity.
The second objection is that at least some of the belief-ascription we observed was an artifact of the way we questioned participants. Some participants might be ascribing belief because it was the best of the available options, not because they really accept that Don believes (thinks) that the claim in question is true. In all of our studies, we asked whether the Capgras patient believes or thinks that his wife is an imposter, but we did not compare these ascriptions to judgments about other mental states debated in the philosophical literature on delusional contents, such as imagination.
contrast belief ascription with another rival attitude advocated in the delusional literature: imagination.
Methods
Participants (N=137) 8 were presented with the frequent story from Experiment 2 (i.e. the prototypical Capgras case). They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, Thinks or Believes, distinguished by the contrasts featured in the probe. In the Thinks condition, participants were asked which better describes the case:
Thinks. Don _____ that Katherine is an impostor. anchors ranging from "Definitely shouldn't" to "Definitely should,"
with no neutral midpoint. Participants could not return to previous screens to change their answers.
Results
We made two predictions in Experiment 4. First, when 'imagines' is explicitly contrasted with 'thinks' or 'believes', participants will still continue to ascribe belief. Second, participants will nevertheless also agree that the patient should not 'believe' or 'think' that Katherine is an imposter.
Both predictions were true. Despite having the opportunity to describe Don's attitude in terms of imagining, participants continued to attribute beliefs to Don at rates significantly exceeding chance. In the Thinks condition, the majority of participants (90%) chose 'thinks' over 'imagines'. nonetheless continue to describe Don's attitude in terms of belief.
Results are visualized in Figure 4 . These findings replicate our previous results suggesting that folk psychology recognizes cases of monothematic delusion as stereotypical cases of belief. They also suggest that attribution of belief to Capgras patients is not due to over-ascription born of charity or the unavailability of other options.
Conclusions
Many theorists deny that monothematic delusions are beliefs. Theorists who claim otherwise nevertheless agree that these delusions aren't stereotypical or clear cases of belief. And both parties are led to these views largely because they think the folk psychological practice of belief ascription compels it. For a debate largely centered on the folk psychology of belief, it is surprising that there has been no empirical investigation of the folk practice of belief ascription in cases of delusion. We sought to rectify this, suspecting that both sides were wrong to assume that delusions resist ready folk psychological classification as belief. To test this suspicion, we conducted a series of experiments to measure how people ordinarily view cases involving such delusions.
It turns out that monothematic delusions are overwhelmingly viewed as beliefs (Experiment 1). Rates of belief ascription were at or near ceiling, strongly suggesting that, at least on the ordinary way of thinking, these delusions are not only beliefs, but clearly and uncontroversially beliefs. They fit at least one stereotypical profile for belief.
Having established that such delusions are viewed as stereotypical beliefs, we tried to better understand why they are viewed that way. It turns out that the delusional patient's verbal behavior is a powerful psychological cue to belief ascription (Experiment 2). In folk psychology, a persistent pattern of asserting that something is true suffices for believing that it's true. Surprisingly, for participants in our studies, a persistent pattern of assertion was a much stronger cue to belief-ascription than a robust and consistent profile of non-verbal behavior was. Apparently, in folk psychology, words speak louder than actions. Or perhaps the way to put it is this:
speech acts are the loudest actions of all. For this, Napoleon Bona-parte was wise to caution, "Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets."
We also investigated whether delusional patients were ordinarily viewed as having contradictory beliefs. Across two studies, participants did tend to ascribe contradictory beliefs. We observed this result both between-subjects (Experiment 2) and within-subjects (Experiment 3). And we provided evidence that when given other ways to describe the delusional patient's attitudes (e.g. as imaginings), participants continue to prefer to describe them in terms of belief (Experiment 4).
Building on previous work in experimental philosophy and psychology, we used two different probes to measure rates of belief-ascription. We consistently found that it's easier to be viewed as "thinking" that something is true than "believing" that it is true. In folk psychology, whenever you believe something is true, you also think it's true, but the opposite does not hold. If you think that something is true, it's still an open question whether you believe it's true. As a dramatic illustration of this, participants in our studies agreed that a delusional patient thinks that his delusion is true without also agreeing that he believes his delusion is true. It has been argued that the significant differences we see when using these two probes reflects an important, substantive distinction within the folk psychology of belief. In particular, it has been argued that the "believes" probe cues one category of belief, thick belief, while the "thinks" probe cues another category, thin belief (Buckwalter, Rose and Turri, 2013; . Previous work also suggests that willingness to assert a proposition is one important criterion distinguishing thick from thin belief. Our results lend further support to the claims made in this line of research.
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Though this work supports the view that adults recognize assertion as a powerful cue for belief ascription, it is also corroborated by work in developmental psychology on the false belief task. A wide range of studies have suggested that when verbal measures are used to assess false belief attributions, children do not pass false belief tasks until around the age of four (e.g., see Baron-Cohen, 1990; Frith, 1989; Hogrefe et al, 1986; Leslie, 1987; Leslie and Frith, 1990; Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001 ).
13
In standard false belief tasks, three-year old children fail to infer a target character's belief on the basis of that character's non-verbal behavior.
However, an ingenious study by Roth and Leslie (1991) found that three-year old children will attribute false beliefs to a target character in these situations when the character asserts a false statement. That is, they found that 3-year old children attribute a
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The distinction between thick and thin beliefs is also corroborated by work in developmental psychology suggesting that children begin using 'think' in mental state attribution much earlier than they begin using 'believes' and that, overall, the use of 'thinks' occurs much more frequently than the use of "believe' in mental state attribution (see Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman and Silber, 1983) .
13
See work by Luo, 2011; Onishi and Ballargeon, 2005; and Surian, Caldi and Sperber, 2007 suggesting that even infants pass false-belief tasks when non-verbal response measures are used.
false belief to a character that is making a deceptive statement. The finding suggests that even though 3-year old children do not pass the standard false belief task -which requires the child to infer an agents belief on the basis of the individuals behavior -they nonetheless attribute false beliefs to an agent who asserts a false statement (see Nichols and Stich 2003 for a discussion of these results).
This suggests that even at a very young age assertion plays a powerful role in belief ascription.
The folk psychology of belief plays an important role in the debate over whether the attitudes that delusional patients bear to the content of their delusion can be adequately characterized in terms of belief. Some say "no"; others offer a qualified "yes", suggesting that if delusions are characterized as beliefs then delusions are "anomalous beliefs," or that they are beliefs in some contexts but not others (Reimer 2010) , or that they aren't "fully" beliefs because they don't "fully meet any relevant folk-psychological stereotype" for belief (Tumulty 2011: 30, n. 2; see also Schwitzgebel 2011 , Schwitzgebel 2001 . Even among theorists who otherwise disagree deeply over monothematic delusions, there is widespread agreement that delusions don't fit the functional profile of belief (Bayne 2010: 330) . Our results strongly suggest that this widespread assumption is mistaken.
While our results suggest that the folk view cases of monthematic delusions as uncontroversial cases of stereotypical belief, we acknowledge that some philosophers engage in viable projects that might permit them to disconnect from the folk psychology of belief and characterize delusions differently. For instance, some philosophers might be engaged in normative projects arguing that the folk are wrong to characterize stereotypical beliefs in the ways we have uncovered. Or perhaps some philosophers wish to provide an account of belief divorced from folk psychology entirely. The present study is not intended to discredit or even dispute such prescriptive or revisionary projects. In the present context, we would only make two conciliatory points in relation to such projects. First, it's still valuable to accurately understand folk psychology because self-understanding is valuable and folk psychology is part of who we are. That remains true even if we can and should aspire to a better psychology. Second, it's important to understand folk psychology because it enables significant success in predicting and explaining the behavior of others (Kitcher, 1984; Fodor, 1987; Lahav, 1992) .
This considerable success in turn provides a baseline standard against which revisionist theories can be measured. Beyond these two points, we tend to favor the conservative view that significant divergence from folk psychology is a noteworthy, though not necessarily prohibitive, cost of a theory. But it's not our purpose to defend that stance here and neither our findings nor our interpretation of them depend on it.
Finally, we end on a speculative note. Our results here suggest that, other things being equal, in folk psychology, repeatedly asserting a proposition suffices for believing it. And repeatedly asserting something is a voluntary activity: we can choose to do so, directly, at will, and self-consciously so. If so, then folk psychology might acknowledge a clear sense in which belief is voluntary. In other words, our results suggest that folk-voluntarism about belief is true (indeed, an extremely strong version of voluntarism). Many epistemologists and philosophers of mind have long argued that voluntarism about belief is false, either as an empirical matter of human psychology or a matter of conceptual necessity about the concept of belief (e.g., Alston, 1988; Bennett, 1990; Hieronymi, 2006 Hieronymi, , 2009 Williams, 1973) . Of course, these theorists might be right and folk psychology radically wrong. But we view it as a cost of involuntarism if it implies that folk psychology is so badly mistaken about a core aspect of belief.
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